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Abstract
Wind power development projects often include compensation for the affected 
communities, but little is known about the efficacy of the alternative compensation 
mechanisms. This study addresses this question by examining the relative potential of 
private and public compensation. We conduct a Choice Experiment (CE) that 
investigates household preferences of compensation for the local siting of a 
hypothetical wind park. Households chose among different alternatives, where each 
alternative was characterized by three varying attributes: the number of turbines, the 
level of private compensation, and the level of public compensation. Results indicate 
the wind park imposes welfare losses to local residents and non-local recreational users, 
with about 35% of these losses corresponding to non-use values. Findings show that 
households prefer public compensation to private compensation, with household’s 
willingness to accept being lower with public compensation than private compensation. 
This finding suggests that estimates of local resistance to wind development depends on 
the compensation mechanism.
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power presents a clear conflict between the dispersed societal
benefits and the concentrated local costs, and while the general
benefits may dominate the local costs, wind development plans
are often overturned because of local opposition. Wind farming
has well-documented impacts on local communities, including
degradation of scenic vistas and landscapes, noise, shadow flick-
ering, as well as impacts on birds, and on other wildlife and eco-
systems (Wiser et al., 2011). As wind development continues, it
will increasingly encroach upon where people live, thus making
local opposition an even greater challenge than it is today.
Environmental valuation studies have attempted to measure
the external costs associated with wind development projects.
This literature comprises hedonic pricing (e.g. Heintzelman and
Tuttle (2012) and Jensen et al. (2014)) and stated preference stu-
dies (e.g. Aravena et al. (2014) and Landry et al. (2012)). As dis-
cussed in detail in Section 2, the bulk of these valuation studies
report local welfare losses due to wind farm development. The
derived estimates provide guidance to decision-makers on the
local costs of siting decisions and social benefits of wind projects.
They also indicate the appropriate level of compensation that
developers may provide local residents to offset for the local im-
pacts of a wind project, although navigating the ethical con-
siderations of compensating local residents can be a challenge
(Cass et al. (2010)).
Existing environmental valuation studies have a strong focus
on the household's tradeoff between the negative impacts of wind
farming and private compensation measures. While useful for
several purposes, such an approach fails to address some relevant
considerations. In particular, compensation to local communities
does not have to be limited to individual payments. In some in-
stances, the provision of a local public good can be a viable form of
reparation to local communities—e.g., see Cass et al. (2010) and
Cowell et al. (2011). Though given little attention in the literature,
economic theory provides a rational for such compensation. In
fact, public goods and local public goods are often under-supplied
due to coordination problems and institutional failures, and it
should be unsurprising that some individuals prefer this form of
settlement. Compensation in this case occurs at two different le-
vels: first, it corrects an institutional failure that prevents a local
public good from being provided and, second, like private com-
pensation, it increases overall welfare.
By implementing a stated preference approach in a local
community in western Norway, this study aims to contribute to
the understanding of households’ tradeoffs between wind farming
impacts and private versus public compensation. The paper pro-
ceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of the literature
on local impacts of wind energy and the role of compensation to
local communities. Section 3 introduces the particularities of our
case study and the CE. Section 4 presents the econometric model.
Section 5 presents results and Section 6 concludes.Hoen et al. (2014) use a large sample of property transactions from nine
States across the US and report no effects of wind farming on property values. The
authors point out that a proportion of the data used in Heintzelman and Tuttle
(2012) come from the period between the announcement of the wind farm and its
construction and this ought to be given consideration when interpreting their es-
timations. Gibbons (2014) questions the conclusions reported in Hoen et al. (2014)
the data set included very few transactions in the areas near wind farms.
3 Sims and Dent (2007) use post-construction data on 919 house sales in three
communities in UK and report significant price effects in one of the three com-
munities. In an unpublished study Sunak and Madlener (2012) use data from two
communities in Germany and 1405 sales and re-sales and report a reduction in
property values within the range 21.5–29.7% for those properties located within
1 km from the wind farm.
4 Hanley and Nevin (1999) and Bergmann et al. (2008) have considered welfare
impacts of job creation in the wind farm construction processes. A number of
studies indicate that local opposition and negative attitudes towards wind farming
decreased over the operation life of the facilities (e.g. Devine-Wright, 2005). It
should be noted, however, that negotiations between communities and developers
are over deployment plans, prior to construction when local opposition may be
highest and this is likely to have an effect on demanded compensation levels.2. Literature review
This section starts by reviewing the economics literature on the
effects of wind farming in local communities. The studies include
applications of the hedonic price method and stated preference
methods. We also review some studies in the geography and en-
vironmental planning literatures that provide insights on the re-
lationships between wind farming and local communities, and the
role of public compensation as means for easing local opposition.
The literature on the effects of wind farming on property values
is relatively recent and scattered. Using a large sample of property
transactions, Heintzelman and Tuttle (2012) study the impact of
wind facilities on property values in northern New York State in
the United States (US). The authors report that proximity to a windfarm consistently reduces property values in two out of the three
counties analyzed. The effects in these two counties were large
and declined with distance. For a wind farm located 0.5 miles
away, the property value is, on average, 8.8–15.8% lower. When the
wind farm is located 3 miles away, the negative impact on prop-
erty values is estimated to be 2–8%. The authors conclude that
existing mechanisms, such as easement payments to individual
owners, may have properly compensated those who allowed wind
farm development on their properties but are unlikely to account
for the harm caused to those living in the vicinity.2 Using detailed
data from Denmark on property values and wind turbine location,
Jensen et al. (2014) estimate that visual impacts reduce property
values by up to 3%, while noise reduces property values by 3–7%.3
In a similar study using transactions data fromWales and England,
Gibbons (2015) finds that wind farm visibility, on average, reduces
property values by nearly 6% within 2 km, less than 2% between
2 and 4 km, and less than 1% from 14 km. In a recent study using
data from Rhode Island (US), Lang (2014) found no effect of wind
turbines on housing prices, though this study only considered
single-turbine sites.
Krueger et al. (2011) implement a CE to estimate the costs to
the residents of Delaware (US) caused by the eventual deployment
of an already planned offshore wind farm. It was found that a
near-the-shore development would cause considerable welfare
costs to residents, especially those living close to the coastline.
Landry et al. (2012) on the other hand implemented a CE experi-
ment in North Carolina (US) and found the effects of coastal wind
farming on local recreational visitation to be relatively small.
Consistent with Krueger et al. (2011) two CE studies using data
from nation-wide surveys in Chile (Aravena et al., 2014) and in
Sweden (Ek and Persson, 2014), indicate that individuals prefer
offshore, rather than onshore wind energy developments. Álvarez-
Farizo and Hanley (2002) and Bergmann et al. (2006) implement
CEs in Spain and Scotland and report that wind farm impacts on
flora and fauna as well as on wildlife induced considerable welfare
losses. A Swedish study that conducts a CE considers earmarking
of the revenues for conservation measures (Ek and Persson, 2014).
However, the study was targeted to the general public. As we have
argued, opposition is most relevant at the community level where
the negative impacts of development are salient and where de-
velopment plans may be halted.4
A number of studies outside the environmental valuation lit-
erature and within a more qualitative tradition have emphasized
that local compensation for negative impacts of wind energy may
be private or public. Examples of private compensation are lump-
sum payments and share of profits to property owners, and re-
duced power tariffs to local inhabitants. Cowell et al. (2011)
introduced the following typology of community benefits:
(1) Community benefit fund based on lump-sum or regular pay-
ment, (2) direct (in-kind) investments in schools, sports facilities,
environmental improvements, etc., (3) community ownership of
shares of the wind project, and (4) local contracting and employ-
ment during construction and operation. Category 2 explicitly
entails the provision of local public goods. Categories 1 and 3 may
involve both private and public compensation, while category
4 involves private compensation to a limited number of residents.
In a comparative study of six European countries, Toke et al.
(2008) report that countries such as Denmark and Germany have
been more successful at delivering benefits from wind farming to
local communities and this may explain their larger deployment
rates. In a study based on interviews in the UK, Cass et al. (2010)
conclude that “The normative case for providing community
benefits appears to be accepted by all involved, but the exact
mechanisms for doing so remain problematic.”.
Studies on the siting of waste disposal facilities offer insights
that are worth noting. In a survey-based study from Chile, Claro
(2007) shows that public support for the siting of a waste disposal
facility was lower when cash payments were offered in a refer-
endum question (6.5%), than when no compensation was men-
tioned (10.5%). Follow up questions indicated that this result was
due to a large number of respondents that viewed monetary
compensation as a form of bribery. Notably, when compensation
in the form of a public good was offered, acceptability was highest
(14.9%).5 While the referendum questions used in this study are
rather general, and are of limited applicability to wind farming, the
results suggest that reparation may be more acceptable to some
people if the compensation is in similar terms as the harm. Claro
reasons that public goods – being collective - are more similar to
environmental goods than private payments. The author also notes
that attitudes may depend on cultural values, implying that the
results of the study do not necessarily generalize to other cases.
Given the importance of compensation for acceptability of
wind energy developments and the limited knowledge about the
efficacy of different compensation schemes, a comparison of
public and private compensation schemes is of interest to re-
searchers and practitioners. Even if some studies have discussed
the role of public and private compensation, there are, to the best
of our knowledge no studies attempting to quantify the merits of
these options, and in particular for wind development.3. Local context: Wind energy in Norway
Due to a favorable topography and abundance of water re-
sources, hydropower has dominated power generation in Norway
-hydro accounts for about 97% of total electricity production (NVE,
2013). Norway is a net exporter of green electricity, with about 12%
of its production sold to other Nordic countries and Northern
Europe (NVE, 2013).6 With increasing demand for renewable en-
ergy in the EU, the Norwegian Government has plans to build two
new subsea interconnectors with Germany and the United King-
dom. The plans are, however, highly controversial due to expected
higher electricity prices (e.g. Green and Staffell, 2014), and nega-
tive effects on local environments (e.g. Gullberg et al., 2014, Solli,
2010, Forum for natur og friluftsliv 2011).7 Given these5 Kunreuther and Easterling (1996) note that different types of compensations
can be effective for siting facilities such as landfills, but do not work well for in the
case of nuclear waste repositories.
6 In short periods of low hydropower production in winter, Norway might have
a net import of power.
7 The Forum for natur og friluftsliv, adopted the following position: “We have
enough energy in Norway. The potential for energy efficiency and energy recyclingparticularities, it is somewhat unsurprising that wind energy de-
ployment plans are often met with local opposition.
The share of wind electricity production in Norway in 2013 was
1.5%, while in other Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and
Sweden wind accounted for 33% and 7% of total electricity pro-
duction (IEA, 2013). However, the Norwegian government has
started to follow the example set by its Scandinavian neighbors in
supporting the development of wind power. The southern and
western provinces along the North and Norwegian Seas have
considerable wind energy resources (e.g. Hofstad et al., 2005).
Before the introduction of the green certificates market in
Norway (in collaboration with Sweden) in 2012, selected wind
energy developments in the country received direct support from
the government (IEA, 2013). In 2013 Norway had 20 functioning
energy farms with 356 windmills (IEA, 2013). Over the years, the
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) has
kept a detailed register of all windfarm licenses applied for. It
shows that about half of wind projects are actually realized. The
other half of wind development projects have been declined by
NVE or withdrawn by developers due to either local opposition or
other reasons. See Fig. 1 for a geographical distribution of existing
wind farms and declined wind farm license applications as of
January 2016; see also Vindportalen (2014).4. Choice experiment
To investigate household preferences we conducted a Choice
Experiment (CE) that considered the siting of a hypothetical wind
park in Sandnes, Norway (see Fig. 1). Sandnes has about 71,900
inhabitants and an area of 286 Km2. A number of criteria were
used to choose this municipality and the exact location of the wind
farm. These included, in order of importance, wind farming po-
tential- based on detailed information on wind farming projects in
Norway generally and nearby areas especially,8 viability of the
wind farming project so it would appear realistic to respondents,
and impact on local communities in terms of visual impacts
mainly. The hypothetical wind farmwas located in an area that has
traditionally been used for hiking and for other recreational pur-
poses by area residents. The wind farm sits in the administrative
area of Riska,9 on the hills to the east of the Frøylandsvatn lake,
about 1 km away from road 516. Road 516 connects Hommersåk,
Riska´s main urban area with Sandnes´ main urban settlement
(also known as Sandnes). Hommersåk is located 2 km north of the
wind farm and 12 km north of Sandnes town center. The wind
turbines would be visible from this road and from most areas in
Hommersåk.
The experimental design was informed by informal discussions
with local inhabitants and results from a small pilot survey with 31
respondents. We employed the professional survey company Ipsos
to implement an on-line survey on a sample of households located
in Sandnes. Our sampling strategy divided the population of
Sandnes into two subpopulations: households living close to the
wind farm (in Riska) and households living elsewhere (not in
Riska). As discussed earlier, the former group (which has a much
smaller population) was over-sampled as we sought to get suffi-
cient variation in the data to investigate location effects. Virtually(footnote continued)
is vastly under-utilized. It is naive to believe that we can be Europe's green battery”.
It should also be noted that the expansion of hydro capacity has become increas-
ingly difficult due to physical and environmental regulatory constraints.
8 Confer NVE's database on all existing and planned windfarm projects at
https://www.nve.no/konsesjonssaker-og-hoeringer/
9 Riska has about 6555 inhabitants and is one of the 13 administrative areas of
Sandnes.
Fig. 1. Location of windfarms in Norway (and location of hypothetical windfarm). Built windfarms. Declined windfarm license applications. The size of the blue and red
circles indicate the generating capacity of the wind farm project: small (o10 MW), medium (10–100 MW) and large capacity (4100 MW).
Source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE): http://gis3.nve.no/link/?link¼vindkraftverk The maps were retrieved in January 10, 2016.
Fig. 2. Example of a choice situation.
all households in Riska were contacted by phone, while recruit-
ment of the remaining respondents was assisted by a random-
dialing system.
The questionnaire consists of three sections. The first section
starts with demographic questions on general socio-economic
characteristics, followed by warm up questions on general
knowledge and perceptions of wind power. The second section
contains the core of the questionnaire, namely the CE. It starts
with a scenario description (see Annex) that contains two maps
showing the location of the wind-park as well as written and
graphic descriptions of the different attributes of the wind park
and the compensation mechanisms that may be implemented. The
scenario description makes it clear that the wind farm is hy-
pothetical. It explains that the windmills to be used are 90 m high
and that the visual impact they may have will depend on the
number of windmills and how they are placed in the terrain. It also
briefly mentions that larger wind farms emit more noise and have
a greater impact on birds and other wildlife. The scenario is fol-
lowed by 10 choice situations. The third section contains follow up
questions related to the attributes used in the CE.
Each choice situation consists of 2 alternatives, each one
characterized by three characteristics: the number of turbines
(visual impact), the level of deduction on household electricity bill
(private compensation), and the size of community sports facility
(public compensation. See Fig. 2 for an example of a choice si-
tuation. Given the CE's focus on energy, a deduction of the elec-
tricity bill is an appropriate payment vehicle for private compen-
sation. The decision on the type of public compensation was based
on an analysis of local needs and a study of the municipality's
budget plans. While local governments in Norway have sometimes
provided local sports facilities of the type considered in our ex-
periment, it is often the case that existing facilities get over-
crowded in peak-hours and the installations and equipment are
old -the sports facility is an impure public good but the compar-
isons public vs private compensation remains..
Construction of the wind project was an alternative in all the
choice sets. This design feature emerged from the pilot study,
which revealed that only one individual out of 31 preferred the
status quo—i.e., no project. The near universal choice for wind
farm scenarios may be due to preferences, but considering deci-
sions involving public interests are often centralized in Norway, it
may stem from a desire to express preferences for an exogenously
determined project. The levels of the private compensation attri-
bute were 0, 400 and 800 NOK reductions in electricity bill per
year per household for 20 years (1 USD ¼6.1 NOK at time of
survey). The survey explains that 400 NOK and 800 NOK corres-
ponds, respectively, to about 15% and 30% of the annual electricity
expenditure of a typical Norwegian household. The levels of public
compensation were no sports facility, small sports facility and
medium size sports facility. To recreate the impact of the hy-
pothetical interventions, Photoshop visualizations were used.
These recreated what the wind farmwould look like from road 516
as illustrated in Fig. 2. The levels of the wind farm development
were 9 and 18 wind turbines.10 With these three attributes and
attribute levels, a total of 146 choice sets can be generated. The
choice sets were drawn using a complete enumeration method
that optimizes orthogonality while ensuring balance and mini-
mizing overlap.10 Using information from recently built wind farms in Norway (Vindportalen,
2015) a wind farm consisting of 9 wind turbines would have a capacity of about
30 MW, and can provide 4000 households with electricity. With a 25% utilization
rate the windfarm can produce 65 GWh (¼30 MW *[8760 h]*[0.25]*[1 GW/
1000 MW]) which would be enough to supply 4000 Norwegian households with
electricity (¼65 GWh *[1′000000 KWh /1 GWh]*[ 1/16000 KWh] households.5. Econometric model
The CE experiment methodology relies on the idea that in-
dividuals derive utility or satisfaction from the attributes of a good
(or an alternative), rather than utility from the good itself (or the
alternative itself). This approach to consumer theory was first in-
troduced by Lancaster (1966) and, was later operationalized in
econometrics in the Random Utility Model (RUM); McFadden
(1974). Using a RUM approach, we assume that the utility of
household h from choosing alternative =k A B, in choice set
= …n 1,2, , 10 is given by the following linear relation:
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The first two terms indicate the household's (dis)utility from
wind farming is a function of the number of wind turbines de-
ployed and other observable factors included in vector Dh. Speci-
fically, ′ = ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦d dD 1 , 2h h h where d1h takes the value of 1 when the
household is located in the proximity of the wind farm, that is in
Riska, and d2h is 1 when the household uses the development area
for recreational purposes. Using a similar notation we have that
β β β′ = ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦1 , 2h h h . The third term represents private consumption
and has two components: household's income Yh and private
compensation in terms of reduction of the household's electricity
bill. The forth term represents the utility derived from the con-
sumption of a public good, or public compensation which in our
case takes the form of a sports facility. The stochastic component
εhkn is assumed to be i.i.d. and to follow a type 1 extreme value
distribution. We implement a random parameter logit (RPL) model
that controls for unobserved household heterogeneity by allowing
the set of parameters βh to vary. The basic presumption is that
there is heterogeneity in preferences for wind farming that we are
not explicitly controlling for; e.g. Carlsson et al. (2010) and Cherry
et al. (2014). Household h chooses alternative A over alternativeB
whenever >V VhAn hBn. The model was estimated using simulated
maximum likelihood with Halton draws with 500 replications (see
Train, 2003). The econometrics package used was NLogit5.
We estimate the marginal WTA for compensation as the ratio of
the relevant attribute coefficients and the marginal utility of in-
come γ (Hanemann, 1984). Specifically,
α β β
γ
= + × + ×
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d d
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δ
γ
=
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We estimate four Marginal WTA terms for private compensa-
tion, depending on whether the household is locate in Riska
(d1¼1) or not (d1¼0) and on whether the household uses the area
for recreational purposes (d2¼1) or not (d2¼0). Regarding public
compensation we estimate two Marginal WTA terms as our choice
experiment includes two types of sports facility, small and med-
ium, and they are included in the econometric model as two
dummies.6. Results
A total of 802 respondents completed the on-line survey, for an
overall response rate of 41%. 208 respondents, 25.9% of the sample,
were located in Riska and 594 in other areas of Sandnes munici-
pality. 41% of respondents were female while the educational
Table 1
Descriptive statistics. N¼802.
Variable Description Mean (Standard deviation)
Riska No Riska Pooled
sample
N¼208 N¼594 N¼802
# of Wind
Turbines
Number of wind turbines 11.41
(3.99)
12.40
(4.36)
12.14
(4.29)Levels: 9,18
Riska 1 if household is located
nearby wind park
1 (0) 0 (0) 0.259
(0.43)
Use area 1 if respondent uses win-
park area for recreational
purposes such as hiking
0.690
(0.46)
0.522
(0.500)
0.566
(0.496)
Rebate Yearly electricity rebate 434 (324) 448 (319) 445 (320)
Levels: 0, 400, 800
[NOK/yr]
Sports facil-
ity small
1 if small size sports fa-
cility provided
0.348
(0.477)
0.343
(0.475)
0.345
(0.475)
Sports facil-
ity Medium
1 if medium size sports
facility provided
0.382
(0.486)
0.400
(0.490)
0.394
(0.488)
Table 2
Results of the random parameter logit model.
Description Coefficient Standard error
Constant 0.06830** 0.02974
# of Wind Turbines 0.03970*** 0.00513
# of Wind TurbinesRiska 0.07441*** 0.01952
# of Wind Turbines Use area 0.06509*** 0.01269
Rebate 0.00078*** 0.00008
Sports facility medium 0.75626*** 0.07504
Sports facility small 0.47167*** 0.05647
Coefficient standard
# of Wind Turbines 0.01296 0.12477
# of Wind TurbinesRiska 0.10197* 0.05987
# of Wind TurbinesUse area 0.14505*** 0.03845
Pseudo R-Square 0.131
Number of observations 7990
Note: *Significant at10% level; **significant at 5%. ***significant at 1%.attainment was 56% university or technical degree, 37% high
school, 5% secondary school (1% did not respond).11 Before a brief
introduction to wind energy was provided, individuals were asked
about their knowledge of wind energy. 73% of respondents stated
that they understood wind energy well or very well, 25% stated
that they did not understand it very well, and 2% did not under-
stand it at all. While 24% of the sample indicated to be very
worried about global warming, 51% indicated to be a little
worried.12 92% of respondents stated that they were either always
or sometimes in charge of paying the electricity bill in their
household, suggesting a high degree of familiarity with the pay-
ment vehicle used for private compensation.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
empirical analysis. Respondents living in Riska chose the smaller
wind park (9 wind mills) over the larger wind park (18 wind mills)
more often than respondents located in other areas. 56% of the re-
spondents use the area where the wind park would be located for
recreational purposes such as hiking. While 68% of the residents of
Riska stated that they used the area for recreation, 52% of the re-
sidents of Sandnes not living in Riska also did so. This implies that
71% of the sample is directly affected by the hypothetical wind farm
in the sense that they either live in the neighboring area and/or use it
for recreation. The data reveals that those living in Riska chose al-
ternatives with lower compensation slightly more often than those
not leaving in Riska. However, this cannot be taken as evidence that
they would demand lower compensation for a given intervention. As
stated above, these households tended to choose options with the
smallest wind park development.
6.1. RPL estimations
Table 2 presents results for the RPL model. The CE was generic
and the only alternative specific parameter in the model was a11 According to Statistics Norway the percentage of the population in Sandnes
(above 16 years old) in 2015 having higher education (long or short university/
college education) is at 32.7%. Thus, there is some bias towards higher education
among the respondents. This points out that, as with other online surveys and
convenience samples, the survey sample may not be representative of the popu-
lation along some dimensions. This may affect the absolute point estimates but
should not affect the results of interest—the treatment effects and the relative
comparison between private and public compensation.
12 83% of respondents stated that wind energy was important for Europe while
only68% stated that it was important for Norway. Although no question regarding
the importance of wind energy for Sandnes was asked, it seems reasonable to
expect lower figures in this case.constant for alternative A, which always appeared on the left hand
side of the choice set. The constant parameter turned out to be
positive and significant indicating that individuals tended to
choose this alternative more often. All the attributes have a sig-
nificant effect on choice in the expected direction while two out of
three random parameters were significant.
Estimation results show that Sandnes residents prefer wind
parks with a lower number of windmills and less visual impact.
Preferences, however, vary depending on where the household is
located in relation to the wind park and on whether respondents
make use of the intervention area for recreational purposes. In
particular, those living nearby the wind farm (in Riska) and/or
those using the intervention area for recreational purposes ex-
pressed stronger preferences against the proposed wind park. At
the same time, the parameters of the two suggested compensation
mechanisms, namely the electricity bill rebate and the provision of
a local public sports facility, are positive and significant. Re-
spondents would thus allow relatively more intrusive wind farm
developments if sufficient compensation is provided.
6.2. Willingness To Accept (WTA) wind farming
Tables 3 and 4 present estimated WTA wind farming in terms
of private compensation (NOK/year) and in terms of public com-
pensation (sports facility). Standard errors were calculated using
the delta method. Table 3 shows that the mean WTA an extra wind
turbine in the proposed intervention area is 50.84 NOK per year.
This figure applies to individuals that neither live in the nearby
area of Riska nor use the affected area for recreational purposes
and thus provides an indication of the non-use value of the in-
tervention area to the individual. It should however be noted that
most Sandnes residents would occasionally get to see the effects of
the wind park on local landscapes, in particularly when travelingTable 3
Mean Marginal WTA [NOK / Year / Household].
Description Coefficient Standard error
# of Wind Turbines 50.84*** 6.611
# of Wind Turbines × Riska 95.29*** 21.576
# of Wind Turbines × Use area 83.36*** 13.350
Sports facility medium 968.46*** 80.106
Sports facility small 604.02*** 64.230
Note: *Significant at 10% level;**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Table 4
MRS Wind Turbines – Public Compensation.
Description Coefficient Standard Error
Sports facility medium 0.0525*** 0.00651
Riska 0.0984*** 0.02216
Use area 0.0861*** 0.01356
Sports facility small 0.0842*** 0.01185
Riska 0.1578*** 0.03732
Use area 0.1380*** 0.02354
Note: *Significant at 10% level;**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Table 5
WTA an extra wind turbine [NOK/Year/household].
Riska No Riska
Private compensation
Use area 229.49 [n¼1486] 134,20 [n¼11326]
Don’t use area 146.13 [n¼699] 50,84 [n¼10455]
Public compensation
Medium size sports facility 59.50 [n¼23966]
Small size sports facilities 33.40 [n¼23966]
Note: WTA measures for private compensation are derived from Table 3 estimates
while those for public compensation use Table 4 estimates, population data and
costs of providing sports facilities of two sizes.to the northern part of the municipality. As mentioned earlier the
wind park lies only 10 Kms north of the most densely populated
area in the Sandnes municipality.
If the individual uses the area for recreational purposes (but
does not live in Riska) the WTA more than doubles to 134.2 NOK
per year. If the respondent lives in the Riska area (but does not use
the area for recreation) the WTA is somewhat larger, 146.13 NOK
per year. Notably the welfare losses experienced by a recreational
user and by a local resident are of the same order of magnitude.
The result suggests that the deployment area provides significant
recreational services to Sandnes residents and it points to the need
to consider factors that go beyond proximity to the intervention
area in welfare analyses of wind farming. When the individual
both lives in Riska and uses the area for recreational purposes the
mean WTA is 229.49 NOK per year, or about 4.5 times the WTA of
Sandnes residents that neither live in Riska nor visit or use the
area for recreation. This finding provides an estimate of the ratio
between the use and the non-use value of the intervention area to
the average Sandnes resident.
The lower panel of Table 3 shows measures of WTA in terms of
local public sports facility. The two parameters are positive, indicat-
ing that this attribute increases individual utility. While the focus of
this article is not on these parameters, they offer some insights on
whether estimates are reasonable. The sports facility was described
as containing a sports field and a gym. The results reveal that re-
spondents, on average, would forgo 968.46 NOK per year to have
access to a medium size sports center and 604.02 NOK per year to
have access to a small size sports facility. These figures compare fa-
vorably to actual gym membership prices. A one-year subscription in
a large and fully equipped gym in Sandnes costs about 3000 NOK per
year, is consistent with the estimate after considering that our esti-
mates reflect the entire population while membership prices reflect
only the residents with the highest values for participation. Since the
sports facilities were presented in very general terms in the scenario
description, individuals might have also been uncertain about the
quality of equipment and service as well as the actual location of the
facility. We also note that the attribute sports facility (medium size)
was the only attribute with relative large and significant taste het-
erogeneity; see Table 1.
Table 4 shows that Sandnes residents not living in the Riska
area and who do not use the intervention area for recreational
activities, would accept the deployment of an extra wind turbine
for 5.3% (8.4%) of a medium (small) sports facility. If the re-
spondent uses the area for recreational purposes (but does not live
in Riska) he or she would demand 13.9% (22.2%) of a medium
sports facility. As a reflection of the fact that the welfare losses of
local residents and of recreational users are similar, we find that
when the respondent lives in Riska (but does not use the area for
recreational purposes) he would demand 15.1% (24.2%) of a med-
ium (small) sports facility. If the individual both lives in Riska and
uses the area for recreation he would demand 23.7% of a medium
sports facility and 38% of a small sports facility. As expected, the
group that is most impacted by the windfarm demands thehighest levels of provision of the local public good.
To draw some comparisons between private and public com-
pensation mechanisms, we monetize the alternatives using some
simple calculations (see Table 5). Constructing (including land
purchase) and equipping a medium (small) size sports facility in
Sandnes would cost around 60 (25) Million NOK -this cost esti-
mate is based on investment plans for sports facilities (halls) of
various sizes in a number of Norwegian municipalities. Assuming a
standard 20 year operating period with annual operation costs of
3% of initial overnight costs and an annual 3% discount rate, the
cost of a medium (small) size sports facility is 5.7 (2.4) million NOK
per year. With 23,966 households in Sandnes, the cost per
household of a medium (small) facility is 238 (100) NOK per year.
From the results, Riska residents (the group most negatively af-
fected) are willing to accept 23% (38%) of a medium (small) sports
facility for the deployment of an extra wind turbine. Thus, num-
bers suggest the cost of providing the marginal increment of a
medium (small) facility to offset the deployment of an additional
wind turbine is about 59.5 (33.4) NOK per year.
Table 5 shows that WTA in terms of private compensation is
typically higher than the WTA in terms of public compensation.
Only the group of households living outside Riska that do not use
the deployment area for recreation have a lower WTA in terms of
private compensation than in terms of public compensation in the
form of a medium size sports facility. The apparent preference of
public over private compensation is reinforced by the fact that
while the estimated private compensations would leave all groups
of residents indifferent, public good compensation would leave
recreational users living in Riska indifferent while all other
Sandnes residents would be better off.7. Conclusion and policy implications
In this study we used a stated preference approach to examine
the welfare impacts of wind farming in the municipality of
Sandnes, Norway. We found that the welfare loss experienced by a
household located in the vicinity of the wind farm (o4 km) is only
slightly higher than that experienced by a household who uses the
deployment area for recreational purposes (but lives farther away
from the deployment site, typically 410 km, or local recreational
users). About 35% of the welfare losses experienced by these two
types of households are non-use values. Our results highlight that
while there has been an emphasis on impacts on local commu-
nities, non-NIMBY (not-in-my-back yard) factors such as recrea-
tional and non-use values may be significant and should be given
explicit consideration in the welfare analysis of wind farming.
These results are based on willingness to accept measures that
are typically used in the environmental valuation literature. We
have emphasized and explored the possibility that compensation
does not have to be restricted to individual payments (or private
compensation). It may also take the form of providing a local
public good (or public compensation). We found that local re-
sidents would trade lower levels of private compensation for
higher levels of provision of a local public sports facility. Further,
the cost of compensating for people’s welfare loss from an extra
wind turbine in terms of the local public good appears to be
generally lower than in terms of private compensation. The result
is particularly important as it suggests that welfare measures de-
rived in the environmental valuation literature, may over-estimate
local resistance to wind energy development.
Among the reasons why compensation in the form of a local
public good should be given explicit consideration as a form of
compensation in wind farming include: 1) Local public goods are
often under-supplied and have the potential to generate con-
siderable individual and communal welfare gains. 2) Reparation
may be more acceptable to some people if the compensation is in
similar terms as the harm -public goods – being collective - are
more similar to environmental goods than private payments-. 3)
Open availability to the community of local public facilities allows
coverage of a large number of households. 4) Wind energy de-
velopers may serve as possible facilitators in the process of co-
ordinating contributions to a local public good or service. Based on
the significant economic, social and ethical considerations in-
volved in the choice between providing private or public com-
pensation, we believe the issue should be explored further.
While our study represents a step forward in our under-
standing of compensation mechanisms in wind energy deploy-
ment, it has some limitations. Our estimates are affected by the
particular context in which the study was carried out. An im-
portant share of additional renewable energy produced in Norway
will be exported to Europe and opposition to development plans is
particularly high among certain groups. In countries and regions
where renewable energy is to be used locally to a larger extent,
residents may be more prone to support deployment plans. Thus
in order to have a more complete picture on the trade-offs be-
tween private and public compensation, it is important to under-
take similar studies also in other relevant contexts. Our study used
a rather neutral scenario description. It would be interesting to
investigate how the results would change when different fram-
ings, e.g. an environmental or pro-social frame, are considered.
How private and public compensation compare with com-
plementary approaches, such as those including community
ownership of shares in the wind projects, may be addressed in
future studies. Future efforts may also consider the interplay be-
tween compensation mechanisms and the ethical considerations
that often exist in the siting processes and decisions.Acknowledgments
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First screenshot
This section introduces a hypothetical case of a wind farm that
is to be built in Sandnes municipality. After an introduction of the
hypothetical wind farm, you will be asked to make a number ofchoices where the characteristics of the wind farm vary.
The wind farm is to be located in the northern part of the
municipality (see the red star below in Map 1). Due to favorable
wind conditions, the wind farm is to be placed in a steep area to
the east of Frøylandsvatnet.Map 1: Location of hypothetical wind farm (zoomed in)Visual impact
The windmills to be used are 90 m tall. The visual impact will
depend on the number of windmills and the way they are sited in
the landscape.
Two alternative development plans are under consideration:
The first plan contains 9 windmills with a relatively small visual
impact, whereas the second plan contains 18 windmills and has a
greater visual impact. Larger wind farms are typically noisier and
have higher impacts on birds and other wildlife.
Second screenshot
The following three pictures show the view from highway
516 without a wind farm, with a small wind farm (with 9 wind
turbines) and a large wind farm (with 18 windmills). The
pictures were taken one kilometer from the site of the wind
farm.
[The three pictures were included in the survey. See Fig. 2 for two
sample pictures. A map similar to Map 1 above showing where the
pictures were taken from was included]
Third screenshot
Compensation
Wind farms could be well visible in the landscape. In order to
compensate the residents of Sandnes for any negative effects that
might arise from a wind farm, two compensation mechanisms
may be implemented:
a) A yearly electricity bill rebate to each household. The elec-
tricity bill will be reduced by a fixed amount every year for the
following 20 years. The household electricity bill can be re-
duced by:
400 NOK per year.
800 NOK per year.
For an average Norwegian household consisting of 4 people the
amounts correspond to around 15% and 30% of the total annual
grid rental.
b) The construction of a sports facility for the residents of
Sandnes. The sports facility will consist of sports-field and a
gym. The sports facility can be of two different sizes:
Small: A small sports-field and gym.
Medium: A medium size sports-field and gym.
[Sports icons were included in the survey as visual aid. See Fig. 2].
Fourth screenshot
We would like to study your attitudes towards the construction
of a wind farm as described above.
In what follows you will be presented with 10 different choice
situations. In each choice situation we will ask you to choose be-
tween two alternatives for constructing the wind farm. The two
alternatives vary with regard to size of the wind farm and the level
of compensation to your household and your community. Some
alternatives will not offer compensation.
After you have chosen between one of two alternatives for
construction, you will be asked whether you would accept the
development as described in the alternative you chose.
Important: Please treat each choice situation as being in-
dependent from the others.References
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